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Abstract—Public blockchains such as Ethereum and Bitcoin
provide transparency and accountability, and have strong non-
repudiation properties, but fall far short of enterprise privacy
requirements for business processes. Consequently consortiums
are exploring private blockchains to keep their membership and
transactions private. However, private blockchains do not provide
adequate protection against potential collusion by consortium
members to revert the state of the blockchain. To countenance
this, the private blockchain state may be “pinned” to a tamper
resistant public blockchain. Existing solutions offering pinning
to the public blockchain would reveal the transaction rate
of the private blockchain, and do not provide a mechanism
to contest the validity of a pin. Moreover, they require that
all transactions and members of the private blockchain be
revealed. These challenges are hampering the wider adoption of
private blockchain technology. We describe the primary author’s
‘Anonymous State Pinning approach’, which overcomes these
limitations and present a security proof to demonstrate pins
can be challenged without compromising these properties. We
perform a gas cost analysis of the implementation to estimate
the operating cost of this technology, which shows that pinning
a private blockchain at the rate of one pin per hour would cost
US$508 per year. A hierarchical pinning approach is proposed
which would allow many private blockchains to pin to a manage-
ment blockchain which would then pin to Ethereum MainNet.
This approach saves money, but at the cost of increased finality
times.
Index Terms—blockchain, pinning, private, ethereum, anony-
mous, sidechain
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we focus on private consortium blockchains,
and specifically on the “Anonymous State Pinning” approach
previously proposed by the primary author, to make private
blockchains more secure and less vulnerable to collusion by
members attempting to revert the blockchain state [1]. We
propose a delegate blockchain architecture which allows the
security properties of Ethereum MainNet to be leveraged
whilst not impacting the performance of MainNet or incurring
significant transaction costs.
We organised the paper as follows to provide context for
the proposed approach: the Background section has a brief
introduction to blockchain, and then describes Ethereum, the
platform on which the methodology is built. We introduce the
concept of private blockchains and the enterprise version of
Ethereum, explain what ‘state pinning’ is and the importance
of having ‘finality’ for blocks so that they can be added to the
blockchain. The next section, Related Works, reviews alterna-
tive existing techniques for pinning, showing that they are not
appropriate for private blockchains. The remaining sections
describe the approach in detail, how pins can be contested,
and how participants can be added and removed [1]. We
demonstrate, via a formal security proof, that selected pieces
of information to challenge a pin does not reveal previous
or future state pins, hence preventing malicious activity to
hamper the posting of valid pins, and keeping the pinning rate
private. We analyse the performance of the author’s Solidity
code implementation, which is available on Github [2].
II. BACKGROUND
A. Blockchain
Satoshi Nakamoto [3] created Bitcoin, the first blockchain
platform, in 2008. Blockchains are cryptographically linked
lists of blocks of transactions. Each transaction changes the
state of accounts. Replaying the transactions in all blocks
in order yields the current state of all accounts, known as
the distributed ledger. Blockchain miners agree on which
transactions should be included in the next block using a
consensus algorithm.
Transactions are combined into a block by message digest-
ing the transaction and including that digest in a Merkle Tree.
The Merkle root of all the transactions to be included in
the block is included in the block header. Linkage between
blocks is achieved by including the message digest of the
previous block header in the current block header. Block
headers also include other information such as block number
and consensus algorithm values. This message digest of a
block header, known as a “Block Hash” succinctly captures
all of the transactions from the genesis block to the current
block, thus capturing the state of the distributed ledger.
Users are identified as account holders using ECC key pairs.
Bitcoin and Ethereum have used the secp256k1 curve defined
in Certicom Research’s, “Standards for Efficient Cryptography
- SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters”
[4]. User’s account numbers are 160 bit message digests of the
user’s public key. Thus, a transaction signed with an account
holder’s private key can be verified using the account number
by first deriving the public key from the transaction signature
and then message digesting the public key and comparing it
with the account number.
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B. Ethereum
Ethereum [5] builds on the Bitcoin platform, allowing users
to upload and execute computer programs known as Smart
Contracts. Ethereum Smart Contracts can be written in a
variety of Turing complete languages, the most popular being
Solidity [6]. Code is compiled into a bytecode representation.
The bytecode can then be deployed using a contract creation
transaction. Contracts have a special function called init
which only runs when the contract creation transaction is being
processed. This function is used to initialize memory and call
other contract code. Miners execute the bytecode inside virtual
machines. At present, each miner must execute all transactions
for all contracts and hold the current value of all the memory
associated with all of the contracts. The Ethereum community
is actively working on methodologies to scale the Ethereum
network by sharding the blockchain [7].
Ethereum transactions update the state of the distributed
ledger. They fall into three categories: contract creation, call-
ing a function on a contract, and transferring Ether. Ether
transfer transactions moves Ether from the user’s account to
another account. Contract creation transactions put code into
the distributed ledger and call the constructor of the contract
code, setting the contract data’s initial state. Function call
transactions call a function on a contract and result in updated
state. All types of transactions must be signed by a private key
corresponding to an account and include a nonce value which
prevents replay attacks. In addition to Ethereum transactions,
“View” function calls can be executed on the Smart Contract
code. These View function calls return a value and do not
update the state of the Smart Contract.
Executing code and accessing resources, such as memory,
costs certain amounts of “Gas”. The “Gas Cost” of executing
code is closely tied to the real world cost of executing each
type of instruction. The current “Gas Price” is set for each
block in terms of Ether by the miner who mines the block.
Accounts instigating transactions specify the gas price they are
prepared to pay for their transaction and specify the maximum
amount of gas a transaction can use known as “Start gas”.
This commits an account holder to paying up to a certain
amount of Ether for the transaction. Any unused gas is returned
to the account holder at the end of the transaction. Miners
reject transactions which run out of gas prior to completing
execution.
In the Ethereum public network, “MainNet”, all contract
code and data are readable by any user of any node which
connects to the network. Smart Contracts on Ethereum Main-
Net can only perform permissioning in contract code, limiting
which accounts can update the state of a contract. However,
there is no mechanism to limit which users can read contract
code and data.
The value proposition of Ethereum is that it allows untrusted
parties to use Smart Contracts hosted on a public, distributed,
highly available, secure platform.
C. Private Blockchains and Enterprise Ethereum
Private blockchains are blockchain networks which are
established between nodes operated by enterprises [1]. Only
permissioned nodes belonging to participating enterprises are
allowed to join the private blockchain’s peer-to-peer network
and only permissioned accounts belonging to participating
enterprises are allowed to submit transactions to the nodes.
These blockchains provide the privacy and permissioning
required by enterprises [8].
The need for security and permissioning features over and
above what is available in standard Ethereum [8] has led to
a range of platforms being developed. J.P. Morgan developed
Quorum [9], a fork of the Golang Ethereum implementation
called, geth [10]. Parity Technologies added a Private Trans-
actions feature to their existing Ethereum client. ConsenSys’s
Protocol Engineering Group, PegaSys created Pantheon [11],
an Ethereum MainNet compatible client which aims to meet
the permissioning and privacy requirements of the Enterprise
Ethereum Client Specification [8]. Hyperledger Fabric [12]
is a distributed ledger platform originally created by IBM
and now hosted by The Linux Foundation. This platform
directly competes with Quorum and Parity, offering privacy
and permissioning features. Whereas Quorum and Parity offer
private smart contracts which operate on or in conjunction
with a permissionless blockchain, Hyperledger Fabric offers
the ability to host one or more smart contracts on a private
blockchain called a “channel”. Hyperledger Fabric allows mul-
tiple channels to be operated on the one network, thus allowing
for multiple sets of private contracts between different sets of
participants to operate on the one network.
The strong privacy and permissioning features required by
enterprises are poorly served by the permissionless Ethereum
MainNet [5] which provides strong authenticity and non-
repudiation properties, but no privacy or confidentiality [13].
However, these strong non-repudiation properties mean that
Ethereum MainNet is the ideal location for securely storing
data for which the authenticity and integrity of the data is
paramount.
D. State Pinning
State Pinning is defined as putting the Block Hash of one
blockchain into another blockchain. For instance, including the
Block Hash of a Private Blockchain in Ethereum MainNet.
As the Block Hash from the Private Blockchain is included in
Ethereum MainNet at a particular block number, it indicates
that the state of the Private Blockchain can be represented by
that Block Hash at that time. A majority of participants of the
Private Blockchain could collude to alter the historical state
of the chain [14]. State Pinning allows minority participants
of the chain to prove to governmental regulators and others
that the state of the chain has been altered, by showing that
the correct state matches the pinned Block Hash.
When the state of a consortium blockchain is pinned it is
important to maintain the privacy of blockchain participants
by not revealing the participants of the blockchain or the
blockchain transaction rate. Not disclosing the transaction rate
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of a private blockchain is important as attackers may be able
to infer activity based on this.
E. Finality
A block is deemed final when it can no longer be changed.
In some consensus algorithms, such as PoW, finality is prob-
abilistic, where as more blocks are added to the end of the
blockchain, older blocks are less likely to be reordered. Con-
sensus algorithms such as Istanbul Fault Byzantine Tolerant
(IBFT) [15] give “instant” finality, where once a transaction
has been included in a block minted by a validator, it can not
be changed.
III. RELATED WORKS
This section outlines existing techniques for pinning the
state of one blockchain to another blockchain.
A. Merge Mining
Merge Mining [16] [17] [18] is a technique in which the
Block Hash of a low hashing power public blockchain, such
as NameCoin, is included in a more secure higher hashing
power blockchain, such as Bitcoin. In this scenario, the Bitcoin
miners must validate NameCoin transactions prior to including
the Block Hash in a transaction on the Bitcoin network. The
mined transaction can then be included in both the Bitcoin
and NameCoin blockchain. Merged Mining relies on both
blockchains using the same consensus algorithm, and assumes
that all transactions can be viewed by both blockchains. As
such, this technique is not usable in a private blockchain
scenario where transactions must not be revealed outside the
blockchain.
B. Tethered Permissioned Private Chains
After discussions with the primary author, the Kaledio team
developed Tethered Permissioned Private Chains [19] [14] to
reduce the risk of state reversion occurring by posting the
state of the blockchain onto Ethereum MainNet. In Kaleido’s
system, an entity similar to the proposed Quiet Guardian
[1] may be used to submit Pins on behalf of blockchain
participants, and has to reveal itself. Moreover, the rate of
transactions on the consortium chain is revealed on Ethereum
MainNet due to the number of posted Pins. Additionally, the
solution lacks a method of contesting a Pin posted to Ethereum
MainNet.
C. Polkadot
In Polkadot [20] Para-Chain blocks are sealed on the Relay
Chain after transactions and zero knowledge non-interactive
proofs proving the transactions result in valid state changes
are validated. The block sealing involves including the block
header hash in the Relay Chain. This system requires Val-
idators which are randomly allocated to the Para-Chain to
be able to view transactions on the Para-Chain and then
posting to the Relay Chain. This requirement for randomly
allocated Validators to view information on the Para-Chain is
incompatible with the concepts of private blockchains which
need to restrict the list of participants. Additionally, having
Validators post Block Hashes will reveal the Validators to all
members of the blockchain system.
D. BTC Relay
BTC Relay [21] is a method for allowing users of Ethereum
to confirm Bitcoin transactions. Relayers are compensated
for posting Bitcoin block headers to a Smart Contract on
Ethereum. Bitcoin transactions are confirmed by users sub-
mitting Merkle proofs showing that a transaction belonged
to a certain block. From a blockchain state pinning perspec-
tive, BTC Relay pins the state of the Bitcoin blockchain to
Ethereum.
BTC relay relies on PoW mining difficulty for its security.
Multiple active Relay nodes must be prepared to post the block
header for each block. In this way, if one Relay node posts a
block header of a fork of the chain, other Relay nodes can post
the block header of the longest chain. Transactions can only
be validated if the block header they relate to is on the longest
chain and if at least six block headers have been posted on
top of the block header that the transaction relates to [22]. As
attackers can not produce a longer chain than the main Bitcoin
blockchain due to the mining difficulty, they are unable to
confirm transactions based on a malicious fork.
PoW is not an appropriate consensus algorithm for private
blockchains as organisations do not wish to allocate resources
to mining of blocks [8]. Given the reliance of BTC relay on
PoW mining difficulty, it is inappropriate for pinning private
blockchains.
E. Summary
None of the existing state pinning approaches are appropri-
ate for pinning the state of private blockchains. In particular,
none of the approaches allows pinning of private state, without
revealing transactions, whilst keeping the participants of the
private blockchain secret, and allowing those participants to
challenge the pinned state.
Private blockchain participants need to keep the rate of
transactions secret. If state pins are related to transactions or
blocks of transactions, then the posted Pins can betray the rate
of transactions on the private blockchain. None of the existing
techniques provided any method of obscuring or hiding the
transaction rate of the private blockchain.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
A. Introduction
To overcome the limitations of existing solutions, a method-
ology was proposed by the primary author [1] which allows
private blockchain state to be anonymously pinned to an
Ethereum blockchain, such as Ethereum MainNet. The chain
being pinned to is known as the “Management Chain”. The
private blockchain state is represented as the Block Hash
for a block on the private blockchain to be pinned to the
Management Chain. The Block Hash of the block is known
as a “Pin”. Pins are posted into a key-value map, in which
the key is specially crafted, and the value is the Pin. The key
values are derived using a technique inspired by the ideas of
3
Code Division Multiple Access [23] in which multiple sets
of information can be overlaid on the same channel without
interfering with each other. The technique is similar to the use
of Pseudo Random Functions for identifying friend or foe and
for “storageless” distribution of random numbers [24] and the
use of salted hashes for secure communications [25] in that
random looking numbers are derived from a combination of
public and secret values.
B. Masked and Unmasked Participants
For each private blockchain, there are masked and unmasked
participants. Unmasked Participants have their Ethereum Ad-
dresses listed as being members of the private blockchain.
Being unmasked allows the participant to vote to add or
remove other participants, and to contest Pins.
Masked Participants are participants that are listed against a
private blockchain in a way that observers can not determine
their identity. These participants are represented as a salted
hash of their Ethereum Address. Each masked participant
keeps their secret salt value off-chain. A masked participant
may choose to unmask themselves, for example to vote to
contest a Pin. To unmask themselves, they present their secret
salt to the contract. This combined with their sending address
is used to create the calculated salted hash. If this calculated
value matches their masked participant value then they become
an unmasked participant.
C. Map Key Calculation
Pinning values are put into a key-value map. All participants
of a private blockchain agree on a Private Blockchain Identifier
(PBI), a Private Blockchain Secret and a Pseudo Random
Function (PRF) algorithm. The PBI is a public value used to
specify the private blockchain. The Private Blockchain Secret
seeds the PRF. A new 256 bit value is generated by the PRF
each time an uncontested Pin is posted. The key in the map
is calculated using the equation shown below.
MapKeyt = KECCAK-256(PBI, P int-1, PRF (t)) (1)
Where the initial Pin value, Pin-1 is zero.
D. Contesting a Pin
Masked and unmasked participants of a private blockchain
observe the pinning map at the MapKeyt address correspond-
ing to the next Pin, waiting for the next Pin to be posted to that
entry in the map. When the Pin value is posted, they check
that the posted Pin matches their understanding of the most
recent Block Hash of the private blockchain. If the values do
not match, then participants should contest the Pin. To contest
the Pin, they submit to the contract: MapKeyt-1, PRF(t), and
the PBI.
Submitting the previous value of the MapKey allows the
contract to fetch from its own storage the value of the previous
Pin, Pint-1. The contract can then calculate the MapKey of
the contested Pin, MapKeyt, by combining Pint-1, PRF(t) and
the PBI using the equation above. Given the submitter of the
transaction knows the PRF(t) which combined with the PBI
links the previous MapKey, MapKeyt-1, and the calculated
MapKey, MapKeyt, it implies that both of the MapKeys
correspond to Pins for the private blockchain denoted by
PBI. The further implication of knowing PRF(t) is that the
transaction submitter has access to the Private Blockchain
Secret, which implies that they are a member of the private
blockchain.
Once a Pin is marked as contested, the unmasked partici-
pants of the private blockchain must then vote on the validity
of the posted Pin. At this point, masked participants will
need to unmask themselves to vote. This could be viewed
as analogous to a situation in which companies that have
a traditional private written agreement are in dispute. Under
normal circumstances the companies may be able to keep their
agreement private. However, in case of dispute, the companies
need to make public their agreement and go to the courts
to resolve the matter. Similarly, masked participants need to
unmask themselves if they wish to vote on a disputed Pin.
Pins can only contested for a fixed period known as the
“Pin Dispute Period”. After this period has passed, Pins can
be viewed as being final.
If a Pin has been successfully contested, the Pin value is
replaced with the value 0xFFFFFFFF and all participants
use the next PRF value PRF(t+1) to calculate a new MapKey
value, MapKeyt*.
E. Hiding Participants
Pins are posted to the Management Chain using Ethereum
transactions. As all Ethereum transactions are signed, this
means that the act of posting a Pin reveals that the entity
posting the Pin is a participant of the private blockchain.
To hide the true participants of the private blockchain, the
blockchain transactions should be encrypted using a key
known to blockchain nodes belonging to true participants, but
not to a special participant called a Quiet Guardian. As the
Quiet Guardian’s node does not have access to the shared
key, it can only see transaction cipher text, and see the block
header information such as the Block Hash. As such, the Quiet
Guardian can post the Block Hash pins to the Management
Chain, thus earning the “Guardian” part of its name, but can
not submit transactions to the private blockchain, thus earning
the “Quiet” part of the name. The Quiet Guardian could be the
only unmasked participant of a private blockchain. Having a
Quiet Guardian as the lone unmasked participant of a private
blockchain allows the other blockchain participants to remain
anonymous, assuming no dispute.
F. Hiding Pinning Rate
Multiple private blockchains could be managed from the
one Anonymous Pinning smart contract. This would be ad-
vantageous because it would mean that the Pin values for the
different private blockchains could be intermixed in the one
pinning map. This would hide the rate of pinning for any
one blockchain, assuming the same account was used to post
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Fig. 1. Hierarchical Pinning
Pins for all blockchains, as attackers could not discern which
blockchain each Pin was for.
G. Hierarchical Pinning
Pins are posted to the Management Chain using Ethereum
transactions. If the Management Chain is Ethereum MainNet,
then each of the Ethereum transactions will cost money to
execute (see section V for an analysis of how much). If many
private blockchains were posting pins to Ethereum MainNet,
this could cause significant network load as happened due
to the Crypto Kitties game [26] and other games which use
Ethereum MainNet [27].
To over come the problems of cost of transactions and
the possibility of congestion on Ethereum MainNet, a hier-
archical pinning model is proposed. With this model, many
private blockchains could treat another private blockchain as a
Management Chain posting Pins to it. This private blockchain
could in turn post Pins to another private blockchain or to
Ethereum MainNet. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure
1. Pinning to a hierarchy of Management Chains in this way
means that only a small number of Pins on Ethereum MainNet
could be used to secure a large number of private blockchains.
An additional benefit of pinning to a private blockchain is
that the chain’s permissioning could be set such that only
certain nodes could view the blockchain and only certain
accounts could submit transactions to the blockchain.
There are three areas of concern with respect to the hier-
archical pinning approach. The first is that participants of a
private chain must observe and be ready to challenge Pins
being posted at each level of the hierarchy. The second is that
in order for participants of the private blockchain to be able
to challenge at each level of the hierarchy, then need to be
participants of each blockchain at each level of the hierarchy.
The third concern is related to the affects on finality. This third
issue is more complex and handled in a section in the analysis
section of this paper.
H. Implementation Details
The Anonymous Pinning Smart Contract implementation
and test code is available on Github [2]. Some key design
decisions that have been used in the design of the code are
discussed in the following paragraphs. To keep the text below
consistent with the source code, the term “Sidechain” is used
in the text below to mean a single Private Blockchain.
When the Smart Contract is first deployed, a sidechain entry
is created for a “Management Sidechain”. This Management
Sidechain’s sole purpose is to list the participants who can add
a sidechain entry to the contract. This Management Sidechain
has a fixed sidechain identifier of 0x00. No other sidechains
can be created with this value.
The Smart Contract’s constructor takes as parameters a
“Voting Algorithm”, “Voting Period”, and “Pin Dispute Pe-
riod”. The Voting Algorithm is the address of a Smart Contract
which implements the “Voting Algorithm Interface”. The Vot-
ing Period specifies how long participants have to vote before
a participant can request the votes be tallied and the vote
be actioned. These voting values pertain to the Management
Sidechain only. The Pin Dispute Period pertains to all Pins,
and hence all sidechains.
The function addSidechain which adds a sidechain
entry takes as parameters a Voting Algorithm and Voting
Period. These Voting Algorithm and Voting Period values set
the per-sidechain voting configuration.
The process of disputing a Pin is to observe the pinning
map waiting for a Pin to be posted to the expected Map-
Key using the getPin function. When a Pin is detected
which the participant does not agree with, they should call
proposeVote to propose that the Pin be rejected. The
other unmasked participants of the sidechain can then vote
using the vote function. Once the Voting Period expires,
any sidechain participant can request the vote be tallied and
actioned if successful using the actionVotes function.
The actionVotes function must be called prior to the Pin
Dispute Period expiring. The implication of this is that the Pin
Dispute Period must be greater than the Voting Period.
V. GAS USAGE ANALYSIS
Gas is the fee charged for each instruction executed in
Ethereum. Different instructions are charged different amounts
of gas, with the fees reflecting the economic cost of executing
the instruction. Users specify the price they are prepared to pay
for the gas in each of their transactions. Miners preferentially
include transactions in blocks which are configured to pay the
highest gas price. As such, transactions which are submitted
with a higher gas price are more likely to be included in any
given block.
The Ethereum Gas Station [28] publishes live statistics on
how quickly transactions will be processed based on the gas
price specified for a transaction. For example, on February 18,
2019, it showed that some miners would process transactions
at 1.0 gwei, however only twenty-six blocks in the past 200
had included transactions at this price. If a user was prepared
to pay 6.0 gwei, then their transaction was likely to be
processed within the next two blocks. Given an average block
time of 15 seconds, this translates to transactions possibly
being processed sometime in the next fifty minutes for gas
prices of 1.0 gwei or with a high degree of probability
processed in the next thirty seconds for gas prices of 6.0 gwei.
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Fig. 2. Transaction Confirmation Time versus Gas Price, Source data:
Ethereum Gas Station [28]
This range of confirmation time versus gas price is shown in
Figure 2. Confirmation times for gas prices below 1.0 gwei are
either very high, or the transaction does not get mined at all.
As the gas price increases, the confirmation time decreases. At
6.0 gwei, the transaction is likely to go into the next block.
As such, there is no benefit to users for offering to pay gas
prices above 6.0 gwei as the transaction is already likely to
be mined as soon as it can be.
Gas pricing in Ethereum is extremely fluid. This 6.0 gwei
value is double the value for which transactions could have
been mined for expeditiously in August 2018 [29]. This
increase is due to the current high network load which is
seeing the Ethereum blocks at 100% capacity. However, at the
same time the gas price required to execute a transaction ex-
peditiously has doubled, the price of Ether has approximately
halved. As such, the US$ price of executing Smart Contracts
is approximately the same now in February 2019 as it was in
August 2018.
The gas usage for the reference implementation of the
Sidechain Anonymous Pinning contract is shown in Table I.
The values reflect the fact that the base cost of all transactions
in Ethereum is 21,000 gas, that each write to a new storage
location costs 20,000 gas, that subsequent writes to storage
locations costs 5,000 gas, that gas is refunded for deleting
storage locations, and that most other common functions cost
relatively little compared to the cost of data storage. In the
table, the gas cost to US$ conversion is calculated based on
an Ether price of US$148, and the fact that 1 Ether is 109
gwei. For transactions which are not time critical and involve
a lot of gas, such as contract deployment, it makes sense to
specify a low gas price such as 1.0 gwei. At this price, the
Sidechain Anonymous Pinning contract could be deployed for
US$0.371. For transactions which are time critical such as
voting or pinning, a higher gas cost should be paid to ensure
the transaction is mined quickly. Adding a Pin, with a gas
price of 6.0 gwei, would cost US$0.058.
Pinning strategies are likely to be dependant on the de-
ployment scenario. For some deployments, there may be
transactions irregularly, say once per month. In this scenario,
pinning each block which contains a transaction makes sense.
In other scenarios, Pins might be posted once every one
hundred transactions, with at least one Pin posted per day, but
not more than one Pin per five minutes. In yet other scenarios,
Pins might be posted each ten blocks. As such, determining the
cost of using this technology is situation dependant. However,
assuming one Pin per hour, this would add up to an annual
cost of US$508.
VI. SECURITY PROOF
To show that anonymous pinning is secure we need to
demonstrate that knowledge of two successive MapKey values,
which may be obtained by observing a Pin being challenged,
cannot be used to compute earlier MapKey values. Attackers
who can determine which MapKey - Pin combinations belong
to which private blockchain can determine the pinning rate of
the blockchain and may be able to infer the transaction rate
of the blockchain. Additionally, the proof must demonstrate
that attackers after a successful challenge to a Pin, can not
determine the replacement MapKey value MapKeyt*. This is
important as an attacker who can calculate values of MapKeyt*
could maliciously insert a invalid Pin values into the map at
MapKeyt* addresses, thus preventing participants from posting
any valid Pins.
A. Assumptions
We assume that efficient computation of preimages for the
function KECCAK-256() is infeasible. That is, that given
a hash value h, it is infeasible to find a value x such that
KECCAK-256(x) = h.
We also assume that the PRF is secure in both forward and
reverse directions, without knowledge of the secret seed value,
the Private Blockchain Secret. In other words, that functions
FPRF+ and FPRF- such that FPRF+(PRF(t)) = PRF(t+1)
and FPRF-(PRF(t) = PRF(t-1)) cannot be implemented
without knowledge of the PRF secret seed value.
We assume that an attacker can observe all activity on
the pinning Smart Contract. As such, the attacker knows all
MapKey, Pin pairs which have been submitted to the contract.
Further, the attacker knows all Private Blockchain Identifier
values which are used in the Smart Contract.
B. Reverse Proof
The attacker, by observing a contested Pin value, corre-
sponding to time t, obtains the following:
• MapKeyt-1, MapKeyt
• PRF(t)
• Pint-1
• PBI (assumed to be known by all parties)
As earlier defined: MapKeyt = KECCAK-256(
PBI, Pint-1, PRF(t)). The attacker wishes to
compute FREV(MapKeyt-1, MapKeyt, PRF(t), all
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Function Call Scenario Gas Used US$*
SidechainAnonPinningV1 Contract deployment 2562653 0.379
addSidechain Add a sidechain to be managed by the contract 133242 0.118
addPin Add a pin to the pin map 64972 0.058
proposeVote
Propose to add an unmasked participant 151007 0.134
Propose to add a masked participant 121635 0.108
Propose to remove an unmasked participant 136646 0.121
Propose to remove a masked participant 122234 0.109
Propose to contest a pin 156481 0.139
vote Vote for or against a proposed vote. Same gas used for all scenarios 54458 0.048
actionVotes
Action a successful vote to add an unmasked participant 67663 0.060
Action a successful vote to add a masked participant 72626 0.064
Action a successful vote to remove a masked participant 47148 0.042
Action a successful vote to remove an unmasked participant 38890 0.035
Action a successful vote to contest a pin 38891 0.035
*Assumes Ether price of US$148, 1.0 gwei for contract deployment and 6.0 gwei for other transactions.
TABLE I
GAS COST ESTIMATES
existing (MapKey, Pin) combinations) =
MapKeyt-2.
Since the previous MapKey value must be derived from the
previous Pin and the previous PRF value, any possible FREV
must determine the previous Pin from the Pin values previ-
ously submitted to the contract, and must compute PRF(t-1)
from either MapKeyt or PRF(t). This implies the existence of
either a preimage attack against KECCAK-256, the existence
of FPRF-, or both, which violates our assumptions.
Therefore, subject to the assumptions above, FREV does not
exist.
C. Forward Proof
The attacker has available the same information available
as in the Reverse Proof. The attacker wishes to compute
FFWD(MapKeyt-1, MapKeyt, PRF(t)) = MapKeyt*.
Since the MapKeyt* value must be derived from the next
PRF value, any possible FFWD must compute PRF(t+1) from
PRF(t). This implies the existence of FPRF+ which violates our
assumptions.
Therefore, subject to the assumptions above, FFWD does not
exist.
VII. KEYED HASH USAGE OF KECCAK
KECCAK-256 [30] is used as a keyed hash when calculat-
ing MapKeyt. As KECCAK is not subject to length extension
attacks, this usage is not vulnerable to such attacks.
VIII. AFFECTS OF PINNING ON FINALITY
When a private blockchain is pinned to a Management
Chain, a block may only be considered final when a Pin
representing the block can no longer be challenged. If the
Management Chain is Ethereum MainNet, then Ethereum
MainNet’s probabilistic finality needs to be considered. Values
are often read back from Ethereum MainNet six blocks from
the end of the chain to ensure chain reorganisations are
extremely unlikely to change values read from the distributed
ledger. Blocks closer to the end of the chain can be used.
However there is a risk that the block will be removed,
and hence a different value returned. As such, by the time
observers see a Pin being posted that they would wish to
contest, the Pin could be six blocks old.
If the participant which wishes to contest a Pin is a
Masked Participant, they would need to submit a transaction
to unmask themselves prior to commencing the process to
challenge the Pin. They then need to submit a transaction
to the proposeVote function, proposing that the Pin be
contested. Other participants which see the false Pin are likely
to simultaneously submit transactions to the proposeVote
function. Only one transaction will successfully start the voting
process and the others will be rejected. Six blocks after the
start of the proposeVote function, all participants on the
private blockchain will be able to see the vote is active
and vote. Once the voting period expires, but before the
Pin Contest Period expires, the vote can be actioned using
the actionVotes function. This means, when pinning to
Ethereum MainNet, the Voting Period should be at least seven
blocks, and the Pin Contest Period should be at least fifteen
blocks: six blocks to see the Pin, plus one block to unmask,
plus a Voting Period of seven blocks, plus one block to action
the vote. Given an Ethereum MainNet block period of 15
seconds, this is 225 seconds or almost four minutes.
If the Management Chain is another private blockchain
which uses IBFT with instant finality, then the Pin Contest
Period could be reduced to five blocks: one block to see the
Pin, plus one block to unmask, plus a Voting Period of two
blocks, plus one block to action the vote. As the block period
of a private blockchain is implementation specific, there is no
was to relate the number of blocks on the private blockchain
to time, for all blockchains.
The period of time between when Pins of a private chain
are posted, the Pinning Period, need to be considered. Though
it could be possible to post a Pin for each block, it may be
more desirable to pin once each time period, say each five
minutes, each hour, or each day. By pinning only once per
Pinning Period, it means that the finality of a block created
at the start of the Pinning Period would be equal to Pinning
Period plus Pin Contest Period.
If a hierarchical pinning approach is used, then for each
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pinning layer there is an extra Pin Contest Period and Pinning
Period to be considered. The Pin Contest Period and Pinning
Period for each layer should be summed to give the worst case
private blockchain block finality time.
IX. CONCLUSION
Private Blockchains which have their state pinned using the
Anonymous State Pinning approach described in this paper
can protect the blockchain from the majority of participants
colluding to revert the state of the blockchain, while maintain-
ing the privacy of participants and hiding the rate that pins of
the state are posted to a Management Chain. An analysis of
an implementation of the approach has shown that it would
cost US$508 per year to pin the state of a private blockchain
to Ethereum MainNet, assuming a pinning rate of one Pin per
hour, and current Ether and Gas prices. A security analysis has
shown that the technique does not reveal information which
could be used to determine future and previous MapKey -
Pin values, or the pinning rate of the private blockchain.
The analysis of block finality has shown that if the private
blockchain was pinned to Ethereum MainNet, that blocks
would not be considered final until a Pin Contest Period of
four minutes has expired plus the period of time between when
Pins are posted to Ethereum MainNet, the Pinning Period.
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